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Abstract
In recent years, a growing number of cryptosystems based on chaos have been pro-
posed, many of them fundamentally flawed by a lack of robustness and security.
This paper describes the security weaknesses of a recently proposed cryptographic
algorithm with chaos at the physical level. It is shown that the security is trivially
compromised for practical implementations of the cryptosystem with finite com-
puting precision and for the use of the iteration number n as the secret key. Some
possible countermeasures to enhance the security of the chaos-based cryptographic
algorithm are also discussed.
Key words: Chaotic cryptosystems, Baker map, Cryptanalysis, Finite precision
computing
PACS: 05.45.Ac, 47.20.Ky.
1 Introduction
In a world where digital communications are becoming ever more prevalent,
there are still services working in analog form. Some examples of analog com-
munications systems widely used today include voice communications over
telephone lines, TV and radio broadcasting and radio communications (see
Table 1). Although most of these services are also being gradually replaced
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Table 1
Multimedia communication systems and their bandwidth.
Communication system Bandwidth (KHz) Sampling frequency (KHz)
Voice over telephone 3.3 8
Radio communications 3.3 8
Radio Broadcast (AM) 5 10
Radio Broadcast (FM) 15 30
TV 5500 12000
by their digital counterparts, they will remain with us for a long time. Usu-
ally the need to protect the confidentiality of the information transmitted by
these means might arise. Thus, there is a growing demand for technologies and
methods to encrypt the information so that it is only available in inteligible
form to the authorized users.
In a recent paper [1], a secure communication system based on the chaotic
Baker map was presented, which is a scheme that encrypts wave signals.
First, the analog signal limited in the bandwidth W is sampled at a frequency
f ≥ 2W to avoid aliasing. At the end of the sampling process, the signal is
converted to a sequence s0 = {s01, s02, . . . , s0l } of real values. Next, the signal
is quantized: the amplitude of the signal is divided into N subintervals and
every interval is assigned a real amplitude value qk, k = 1, . . . , N , its middle
point for example. Thus, a new sequence is generated by replacing each s0i by
the qk associated to the subinterval it belongs to: y
0 = {y01, y02, . . . , y0l }, where
each y0i takes its value from the set {q1, . . . , qN}. Once the original wave sig-
nal is sampled and quantized, and restricted to the unit interval, a chaotic
encryption signal {x0i }li=1, 0 < x0i < 1, is used to generate the ciphertext. This
signal is obtained by either sampling a chaotic one or by a chaotic mapping.
For the purposes of our analysis, the process to generate the chaotic signal
is irrelevant since our results apply equally to any signal. Finally, an ordered
pair (x0i , y
0
i ) is constructed, localizing a point in the unit square. In order to
encrypt y0i , the Baker map is applied n times to the point (x
0
i , y
0
i ) to obtain:
(xni , y
n
i ) =
(
2xn−1i mod 1, 0.5
(
yn−1i +
⌊
2xn−1i
⌋))
. (1)
The encrypted signal is given by yni , where n is considered as the secret key of
the cryptosystem. As a result, a plaintext signal with values y0i ∈ {q1, . . . , qN},
is encrypted into a signal which can take 2nN different values. For a more com-
plete explanation of this cryptosystem, it is highly recommended the thorough
reading of [1].
In the following two sections, the security defects caused by the Baker map
realized in finite precision are discussed, and then the fact that the secret
key n can be directly deduced from the ciphertext is pointed out. After the
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cryptanalysis results, which constitute the main focus of our paper, some coun-
termeasures are discussed on how to improve the security of the chaotic cryp-
tosystem. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Convergence to zero of the digital Baker map
The proposed cryptosystem uses the Baker map as a mixing function. The
Baker map is an idealized one in the sense that it can only be implemented with
finite precision in digital computers and, as a consequence, in this case it has a
stable attractor at (0, 0). This is easy to see when the value of x is represented
in binary form with L significant bits. Assuming x0 = 0.b1b2 · · · bj · · · bL−1bL
(bj ∈ {0, 1}), the Baker map runs as follows:
x1 = 2x0 mod 1 = x0  1 = 0.b2b3 · · · bj · · · bL−1bL0, (2)
where  denotes the left bit-shifting operation. Apparently, the most signif-
icant bit b1 is dropped during the current iteration. As a result, after m ≥ L
iterations, xm ≡ 0. Once xm ≡ 0, it is obvious that yj will exponentially con-
verge to zero within a finite number of iterations, i.e., the digital Baker map
will eventually converge to the stable attractive point at (0, 0), as shown in
Fig. 1. It is important to note that this result does not depend on the real
number representation method, the precision or the rounding-off algorithm
used, since the quantization errors induced in Eq. (2) are always zeros in any
case.
Considering that in today’s digital computers real values are generally stored
following the IEEE floating-point standard [2], let us see what will happen
when the chaotic iterations run with 64-bit double-precision floating-point
numbers. Following the IEEE floating-point standard, most 64-bit double-
precision numbers are stored in a normalized form as follows:
(−1)b63 × (1.b51 · · · b0)2 × 2(b62···b52)2−1023, (3)
where bi represent the number bits, (·)2 means a binary number and the first
mantissa bit occurring before the radix dot is always assumed to be 1 (except
for a special value, zero) and not explicitly stored in b63 · · · b0. When x0 ∈ (0, 1),
assume it is represented in the following format:
(1.b51 · · · bi+11
i︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0)2 × 2−e = (0.
e−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0
53−i︷ ︸︸ ︷
1b51 · · · bi+11)2, (4)
where 1 ≤ e ≤ 1022. Apparently, it is easily to deduce L = (e−1)+(53− i) =
e + (52 − i). Considering 0 ≤ i ≤ 52, L ≤ 1022 + 52 = 1074. When x0 is
generated uniformly with the standard C rand() function in the space of all
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Fig. 1. Orbits followed by x and y in a practical implementation of the Baker map. As
can be observed, (0, 0) constitutes a fixed point. The number of iterations required
to converge to the origin depends on the precision used, but is always finite in a
computer.
valid double-precision floating-point numbers, both e and i will approximately
satisfy an exponentially decreasing distribution, and then it can be easily
proved that the mathematical expectation of L is about 53 [3].
This means that the value of the secret key n must not be greater than 53. In
other words, it is expected that each plaintext sample y0i cannot be correctly
decrypted when n is greater than 53 (or even smaller but close to 53), since
the counter-iterating process is unable to get x0i from x
n
i = 0 due to the loss
of precision during the forward iterations. Figure 2 plots the recovery error
obtained for different values of the secret key n when a 100-sample ciphertext is
decrypted. It can be appreciated how the plaintext is correctly recovered only
when n ≤ 45. For n ≥ 52, the system does not work at all. As a consequence,
only n = 45 secret keys have to be tried to break a ciphertext encrypted
with this cryptosystem. This takes a modern desktop computer less than a
second for moderated lengths of the plaintext. This attack is called a brute
force attack, which breaks a cipher by trying every possible key. The feasibility
of a brute force attack depends on the size of the cipher’s key space and on
the amount of computational power available to the attacker. With today’s
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Fig. 2. Number of errors when decrypting a 100-sample signal for different values
of the secret key n using double-precision floating-point arithmetic.
computer technology, it is generally agreed in the cryptography community
that a size of the key space K < 2100 ≈ 1030 is insecure [4]. Compare this
figure with the key space K = 45 of the cipher under study.
If the value of n could be arbitrarily enlarged, then the encryption process
would slow down until it would be unusable in practice. Thus, from any point
of view, this is an impractical encryption method because it is either totally
insecure or infinitely slow, without any reasonable tradeoff possible. In [1] it is
said that the encryption is applied to the wave signal instead of the symbolic
sequence. Therefore, in Table 1 a review of some widely used multimedia com-
munications systems with their bandwidth and sampling frequencies is given.
These are the kind of signals that might be encrypted by the system proposed
in [1]. Consider for example TV broadcasting, which transmits 12,000,000
samples per second. It is impossible to iterate the Baker map billions of times
for 12,000,000 samples in one second with average computing power.
Finally, another physical limitation of the cryptosystem is that when n is very
large, each encrypted sample yni would require a vast amount of bits to be
transmitted, which would require in turn a transmission channel with infinite
capacity, meaning that the system cannot work in practice.
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3 Determinism of the ciphertext
Even assuming that the messages are encrypted with an imaginary computer
with infinite precision and infinite speed, using an infinite-bandwidth channel,
and an idealized version of the Baker map, the cryptosystem would be broken
as well because the secret key n can still be derived from only one amplitude
value of the ciphertext. To begin with, let us assume that two quantization
levels are used, that is, N = 2. During the encryption process a binary tree is
generated in the following way:
y0i =

0.25 (0.01)2 → y1i =

0.125 (0.001)2 → y2i =
 0.0625 (0.0001)20.5625 (0.1001)2
0.625 (0.101)2 → y2i =
 0.3125 (0.0101)20.8125 (0.1101)2
0.75 (0.11)2 → y1i =

0.375 (0.011)2 → y2i =
 0.1875 (0.0011)20.6875 (0.1011)2
0.875 (0.111)2 → y2i =
 0.4375 (0.0111)20.9375 (0.1111)2
,
(5)
where (·)2 following the decimal number denotes its binary format. The fact
that the ciphertext uses 2nN discrete amplitudes constitutes its weakest point.
It is possible to directly get the value of n with only one known amplitude. In
Eq. (5), it is obvious that yni is always one value in the set
{
2j + 1
2n+2
}j=2n+1−1
j=0
=
{
1
2n+2
, · · · , 2
n+2 − 1
2n+2
}
. (6)
As mentioned above, in the case that the real values are stored in the IEEE-
standard floating-point format [2], any amplitude value yni will be represented
in the following form:
yni = +1.b1b2 · · · bl × 2−e = 0.
e−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0 1b1b2 · · · bl, (7)
where bl = 1. From Eq. (6), one can see that l+ e = n+ 2. Therefore, we can
directly derive n = (l + e) − 2, by checking which bit is the least significant
bit (i.e., the least significant 1-bit) in all bits of yni .
A more intuitive way to compute n from a single amplitude value, yni , consists
of two steps: i) represent this amplitude value in fixed-point binary form;
ii) count the bits in the fixed-point format of yni to determine the value of
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an integer B, which is the number of bits after the radix dot and before
the least significant bit, i.e., yni = 0.
e−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0 1b1b2 · · · bl︸ ︷︷ ︸
B=l+e
0 · · · 0. Obviously, n =
B − 2. Similarly, for other values of N = 2v, one can easily deduce that
n = (l+ e)− (v+1) = B− (v+1); and for N 6= 2v, the value of n can still be
derived easily, but the calculation algorithm depends on how the binary tree
shown in Eq. (5) is re-designed.
Although in [1] it is hinted that the value of n could be changed dynamically
based on some information of the encrypted trajectory, this idea would not
further increase the security of the cryptosystem as long as 2nN different
amplitudes are still possible for each different n value. This means that the
ciphertext value ynii , whatever ni, can only take values from the finite set
defined in Eq. (6) for the given ni. Hence, for each y
ni
i the value of ni can be
computed as described above and the security is again compromised.
4 Some possible countermeasures of enhancing the cryptosystem
There are many ways to improve the security of the attacked cryptosystem.
This section introduces three possible ones: changing the key, changing the
2-D chaotic map, and masking the ciphertext with a secret signal. Note that
only the basic ideas are given, and the concrete designs and detailed security
analysis are omitted because this is not the main focus of our paper.
4.1 Changing the key
As mentioned above, in addition to the above-discussed security defects of
the secret key n, using n as the secret key has another obvious paradox: from
the point of view of the security, n should be as large as possible; while from
the point of view of the encryption speed, n should be as small as possible.
Apparently, n is not a good option as the secret key.
Instead of using n, better candidates for the secret key must be chosen, such as
the control parameter of the 2-D chaotic map and the generation parameter
of the encryption signal x. If the former is chosen, the Baker map has to
be modified to introduce some secret control parameters, as described in the
following section.
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4.2 Changing the 2-D chaotic map
As shown above, the multiplication factor 2 in the original Baker map is the
essential reason of its convergence to (0, 0) in the digital domain, so the Baker
map has to be modified to cancel this problem, or another 2-D chaotic map
without this problem has to be used.
A possible way is to generalize the original Baker map to a discretized version
over a M × N lattice of the unit plane. For example, when M = N = 2, the
lattice is composed of the following four points: (0.125, 0.125), (0.125, 0.725),
(0.725, 0.125) and (0.725, 0.725). A typical example of Baker map discretized
in this way can be found in [5], reproduced next for convenience.
First, the standard Baker map is generalized by dividing the unit square into
k vertical rectangles, [Fi−1, Fi) × [0, 1), i = 1, . . . , k, Fi = p1 + p2 + · · · + pi,
F0 = 0, such that p1+ · · ·+pk = 1. The lower right corner of the ith rectangle
is located at Fi = p1 + · · ·+ pi. Formally the generalized map is defined by:
Bc(x, y) =
(
1
pi
(x− Fi), piy + Fi
)
, (8)
for (x, y) ∈ [Fi, Fi + pi)× [0, 1).
The next step consists of discretizing the generalized map. If one divides an
N ×N square into vertical rectangles with N pixels high and Ni pixels wide,
then the discretized Baker map can be expressed as follows:
Bd(r, s) =
(
N
ni
(r −Ni) +
(
s mod
N
ni
)
,
ni
N
(
s−
(
s mod
N
ni
))
+Ni
)
, (9)
where the pixel (r, s) is with Ni ≤ r < Ni + ni, 0 ≤ s < N . The sequence of
k integers, n1, n2, . . . , nk, is chosen such that each integer ni divides N , and
Ni = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ nk. The formula can be extended for M ×N rectangles
(see [5]).
With such a discretization, the negative convergence to zero can be removed.
However, another negative digital effect, the recurrence of the orbit, arises in
this case, since any orbit will eventually become periodic within MN itera-
tions. This means that the security defect caused by the small key space is
not essentially improved. Thus, the discretized Baker map must be used when
the key is changed to be its discretization parameters.
Another way is to use entirely different 2-D chaotic maps with one or more
adjustable parameters, which can be used as the secret key instead of n.
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4.3 Masking the ciphertext with a secret pseudo-random signal
An easy way to enhance the security of the cryptosystem is to mask the
ciphertext with a secret pseudo-random signal, which can efficiently eliminate
the possibility to derive the estimated value of n from one amplitude of the
ciphertext. The secret masking sequence can be the chaotic encryption signal
{x0i }, and the parameters of controlling the generation process of {x0i } should
be added as part of the secret key. In this case, the ciphertext is changed from
{yni } into {yni + x0i }. Note that the masking can be considered as an added
stream cipher to the original system. This is a common technique to achieve
stronger ciphers [6].
5 Conclusions
In summary, the new cryptosystem proposed in [1] can be broken due to the
limitation of computers to represent real numbers. Even if an ideal computer
with infinite precision were used to encrypt the messages, the cipher can still
be broken due to the fact that the number and value of possible amplitude
values in the ciphertext depend directly on the secret key n. Furthermore,
for the cryptosystem to work with large values of n, an ideal computer with
infinite computing speed, infinite storage capacity, and infinite transmission
speed would be required. As a consequence, we consider that this cryptosystem
should not be used in secure applications. Some possible countermeasures are
also discussed on how to improve the security of the cryptosystem under study.
An important conclusion of our work is that an idealized map cannot be used
in a practical implementation of a chaos-based cipher.
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